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                                                                Abstract 
 
The financial crisis which erupted in the United States of America in 2007 drove the real 
economic sector into a crisis that has diminshed the world‘s economic growth thereafter.  
There is no single theory that can explain what has happened in the US. Eventhough there 
were a few financial crises models, however all the models are ―meaningless‖. Traditional 
macroeconomic policies were used to restore the distress economy but the policies seemed to 
be ineffective. In this regards, heterodox economic perspectives may provide some answers 
in dealing with such economic crisis that have been experienced by the US. The financial 
crisis experienced in Asia in 1997-98 could provide some ideas for economic crisis solutions. 
The aim of this paper is (a) to discuss  the financial crisis in the US and East Asia 1997/1998, 
and (b) to look at unorthodox economic policies that could possibly be considered in dealing 
with the financial crisis.   
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                                      1.0  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
In general, the US economic crisis constituted of three ―boom-bust cycles‖. The first is the 
boom-bust in the stock market, the second in the housing market and the third in the financial 
market, i.e derivatives. The US‘s economic crisis apparently started since the collapse of 
NASDAQ, i.e the burst of technology stocks on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 
March 2000. The Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1999 increased about 200 percent from 
3,600 in 1994 to 11,000 in 1999. In early January  2000 the Dow Jones passed 11,700. The 
NASDAQ composite index on March 10, 2000 recorded 5048, an increase of more than 500 
percent since 1994. On May 23, 2000 the index dropped to 3164, down about 37 percent. The 
index declined to 1210 in October 2002 dropping about 62 percent and lost about 76 percent 
since March 2000. More than US$7.6 trillion in wealth vanished. The crisis affected not only 
technology related industries but also other sectors of real production such as automobile and 
electronics
1
. The burst of NASDAQ slowly ate up profits and corporate expenditure, and the 
major candidate affected by the reduction of the operating expenditure were the workers. As 
mentioned by the former Governor of the Federal Reserve (FED), Alan Greenspan, the 
collapse of the stock market had affected performance and investment in high-tech industries 
(Fleckenstein, 2008: 109)
2
. Since March 2000 the unemployment level gradually rose before 
the sub-prime mortgage defaults or crisis emerged in late 2007.  
Given the low interest rate policy which expanded money supply by about US$1.6 trillion or 
about 20 percent of GDP from 1996 to October 1999  (Fleckenstein, 2010: 74) and the 
utilization of information and communication technology (ICT) by financial institutions the 
credit market bloated at the rapid pace. The credit that was channeled to the real estate sector 
whether it belongs to sub-prime or prime borrowers were repackaged and sold in the form of 
asset-backed securities (ABS). About 80 percent of the ABS issued in the US was in the form 
of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The securitization of loans into ABS securities 
ostensibly was to increase banks liquidity to meet further demand from the households sector. 
Between 1996 and 2007 households reportedly drew US$9 trillion in cash out of their home 
equity (Chandrashekar, 2009) and the ratio of sub-prime loan/mortgages to total mortgages 
were roughly about 20 percent in 2006. 
Since the late 1990s new financial instruments were created such as collateral-debt 
obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs). The CDO‘s main purpose is to liquidify 
the financial market or in other words the issuance of the securities by the banks to derive 
more money for lending activities. Whereas  credit default swap (CDS) is acting as an 
insurance policy that is engineered and offered by the insurance companies to banks for 
ABSs and CDOs.  These new money market derivatives are traded in unstructured and 
unregulated market i.e over-the-counter (OTC).  The main reason for creating such 
derivatives is to increase bank liquidity and to meet the (more) market demand for loans or 
mortgages.  The market and the government does not understand what kind of risks are 
carried by these new financial products  and the impact of the securities risk on the economy. 
Therefore the market or the government are unable to determine  the volume and value of 
such assets traded through the OTC. The main buyers of those derivatives papers were hedge 
fund, investment banks and other financial institutions with excessive idle funds. The 
securitization of loans to ABSs and from ABSs to CDOs, later to CDO2 and CDSs enlarge 
the ―vicious‖ credit boom and burst cycle.  
                                                          
1
 For example Enron collapsed in late 2002 and a year later WorldCom, Tyco and Global Crossing collapsed 
(Mason, 2009: 72). 
2
 Computer-related shares account for about 40 per cent of the NASDAQ composite index.  
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The collapse of the housing market in 2007 had affected financial institutions. There were 
775 banks which faced problems in the first quarter of 2010 in the US. The problems were 
such as poor risk management policies, bad quality of assets, liquidity problem, increasing 
delinquent loans etc. In 2009 there were about 140 banks which had failed. The subprime 
mortgage crisis had produced spillover effects around the world such as in UK, EU, Japan 
and Singapore. In the middle of 2008, the US was already facing a credit crunch as well as 
some countries in Europe particularly the United Kingdom in which a few banks fell into 
insolvency such as the Northern Rock Bank. The interbank lending market across the world 
had been freezed in August 2007. The European Central Bank (ECB) and FED injected 
substantial liquidity to avert a credit crunch from impacting on the real economy.   
                                                US’s  Financial Crisis. Factors 
There are a few reasons which caused the financial crisis in the USA (Box 1).  The first factor 
is the financial deregulation. In the late 1990s, Congress passed the Gramm Leach Bliley 
Financial Services Modernization Act (GLB) in November 1999 and the former US President 
Bill Clinton signed the bill in 2000. The act became effective in March 2000. The Gramm 
Leach Bliley Act replaced the Glass-Steagall Act which was enacted after the Great 
Depression in the 1930s. The Glass-Steagall (GS) Act  separated commercial banks and other 
financial institutions (such as investment banks). The act disallowed  the commercial banks to 
―gamble‖ depositors money to invest in securities markets. The GS Act ensured banks stick 
to its traditional banking activities. Also the act prohibited investment bankers betting 
deposits on the buying and selling of tradable financial securities that can create huge losses. 
The purpose for the GS Act to was safeguard the US banking system and keep it stable. For 
50 years the Act kept the American banking ―honest‖. However, in 1987 the FED relaxed GS 
Act to allow 5 percent of a bank‘s deposits to be for investment banking, further relaxed to 25 
percent in 1996 and in 1999 the act was abolished (Mason, 2009).  
 
The GS Act was replaced by the Gramm Leach Bliley (GLB) Act and this GLB Act broke the 
rationale of the GS Act. The GLB Act allows commecial banks and investment banks to 
venture into new types of businesses, i.e creating, marketing and buying securities derivatives 
such as CDOs and CDSs. In other words, the Act permits qualifying bank holding companies 
to become financial holding companies and thereby affiliate with a broad range of financial 
operations, instruments, and exposures (Chofaras, 2010: 21). The Act identifies several 
financial activities including retail banking, commercial banking, securities brokerage, 
underwriting, dealing in or making a market in securities, investment management services, 
insurance business, and more (Chofaras, 2010: 21). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act states that 
the Federal Reserve Board (FED) may impose limitations, restrictions, or prohibitions on the 
activities or acquisitions of a financial holding company if the FED believes that the company 
is encountering difficulties with certain activities like mergers and acquisitions (Chofaras, 
2010: 21). Critics of the Act say that the FED has not even been given full powers to 
intervene (Chofaras, 2010: 21). Paul Volcker, the former Governor of the FED was strongly 
against allowing commercial banks to be involved in investment banking type businesses 
because it is dangerous to the financial stability. 
 
Before the GLB Act was signed, Ms Brooksley Born, the former chairman of Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) had warned of the possibility of a  negative impact of 
CDO and CDS or any related products to the financial institutions. She was worried about the 
fast-growing, lightly regulated market for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives— customized 
contracts in which two parties placed bets on the movement of prices for other assets, such as 
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currencies, stocks, or bonds
3
. The main players of establishing the GLB Act are bankers and 
people close to the White House. As cited in Johnson (2010), Summers, Rubin, Greenspan, 
and the financial industry lobbied the government for the GLB Acts. In October 1998 the 
Congress prohibited the CFTC from regulating custom derivatives (such as CDO and CDS). 
In 1999, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets— including Summers, 
Greenspan, Securities Commission (SEC) chair Arthur Levitt, and new CFTC chair William 
Rainer— recommended that custom derivatives be exempted from federal regulation. This 
recommendation became part of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act which was 
signed by President Clinton in December 1999. 
 
The unchecked volume and value of CDOs and CDSs in some ways has ―toxificated‖ the 
financial system. The derivatives grew to over $680 trillion in face value and over $20 trillion 
in market value by 2008 (Chofaras, 2010: 23). CDS grew to over $50 trillion in face value in 
2007.  On 13 April 2008, The Economist stated that the amount of inventoried CDSs stood at 
$62 trillion, a 24 percent increase from 2007, and by the end of 2008 the CDS has approaced  
US$80 trillion (Chofaras, 2010: 23). On 2nd February 2008, an article in The Economist 
stated that a serious person such as Bill Gross, co-founder of PIMCO, the money- 
management firm, put the potential losses from such contracts at 1.25 percent of outstanding 
amount of CDSs (cited in Chofaras, 2010: 23). This would mean a loss of $715 billion. Based 
on Bill Gross‘ estimation of 1.25 percent potential losses of outstanding CDSs, in February 
2008 it would be US$562.5 billion, in March 2008 about US$625 billion and in April 2008 
about US$715 billion (Chofaras, 2010: 23). The financial crisis contracted the US‘s GDP by 
4 percent. The high  volume of the derivaties traded had caused a bubble in the market. When 
that bubble burst, the value of the  securities collapsed and triggered the financial system into 
crisis. In addition the role of rating agencies are crucial in exploding the demand and supply 
of those derivatives. CDOs created by the banks were rated triple A eventhough the rating 
agencies such as Standard & Poor, Flitch and Moody knew that the papers were riskiers. It 
seems that the commercial and investment banks, regulatory body and rating agencies were 
working together in expanding the mentioned derivatives and exploding the market into 
widespread crisis.  
 
The third factor was that the market or the government was unable to identify and estimate 
the risks carried by the above mentioned OTC derivatives. These kinds of products are so 
complex mechanically that it is difficult to discern what kind of risks would be produced by 
the products. The coventional monetary policy, i.e the interest rate policy is unable to check 
the risks or dilute the impact of the OTC derivatives in order to counter the negative impact 
of the products on the financial system. To save the Wall Streets and the affected banks, the 
government indirectly bailed out the banking system. 
 
The fourth factor which is related to the third factor was the FED‘s monetary policy which 
was part of the boom-bust credit cycle. Since the middle of the 1990s the ―boom‖ in the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), i.e the stock market attributed to the low level of interest rate,  
rising real GDP growth and low inflation rate.   As the boom progressed and inflationary 
pressure built up, the FED inevitably tightened the interest rate policy thus triggering the 
financial (credit) crash thereafter. As mentioned earlier the crash of the stock market had  
serious consequences to the economy through wealth effects and this may have affected the 
                                                          
3
 Refer to Johnson, S (2010), The 13 Bankers. The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown,   
Pantheon, New York.  
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banks liquidity. Similarly to housing bursts in 2007, it destabilized the banking system, burst 
the OTC derivatives market and subsequently effected the real economy. 
 
                                                               BOX 1 
                         US Financial Crisis and Policy Response: In Brief 
Factors. 
 High investments in assets markets-equity and housing. 
 overlending to property markets. High credit to house buyers or mortgages 
 financial de-regulation. Replaced Glean-Steagall Act with Gramm Leach Bliley Acts. Allowing 
commercial banks to be involved in businesses other than ―traditional banks‖  such as creating 
and selling derivaties, form an asset management company within the bank and so on. 
 
Government Response 
 the government run budget deficits 
 lower interest rate. 
 FED buying secure and unsecure securities papers from the affected financial institutions. 
 established Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP)(proposed allocation of US$700 billion) 
to clean-up ―toxic assets‖ from the financial system. 
 allowing banks to fail or close down. 
 bailed out selected private firm (for instance General Motor) and financial institution [for 
instance the government agencies such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, American Insurance 
Group (AIG)(US$85 billion)] 
 
Federal Reserve Response (also by central banks in industrialized countries ) 
(i) Achieve the official stance of monetary policy.   
(ii) Influence wholesale interbank market conditions. 
(iii) Influence credit market and broader financial conditions. 
 
Measures to Stabilise Financial system (also taken by some members of EU). 
deposit insurance, restriction on short-selling, capital injections, debt guarantees, asset insurance, asset 
purchases, nationalization. 
 
 
  
 
         The Impact of US (Global) Economic Crisis on Emerging Economies. 
The financial crisis which erupted in the United States in 2007 had spread out and affected 
the world economic growth thereafter particularly since the middle of 2008. Developed 
nations, from Japan to major economies of European Union fell into a severe recession. The 
economic crisis in these countries had influenced other countries, i.e developing countries 
that rely on their market particularly Southeast and East Asian economies (SEA region) for 
instance as shown in  Table 1. The fell in financial markets had affected countries in SEA and 
the Pacifics. Most countries experienced depreciation in exchanges except China and Hong 
Kong. Stock markets in those countries fell in terms of index on average 50 percent. Also the 
global financial crisis, i.e US had inluenced dropped in real GDP of those countries in 
2008/09. Furthermore every country in East Asia and Southeast Asia have seen its exports 
contracted from year 2008 to 2009. While lower commodity prices may be partly responsible 
for these declines, China's slowing domestic economy and worsening export outlook of the 
country is dragging down demand for Asian exports, especially components for further 
processing.  
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                                                             TABLE 1 
                             Impact of Asian Crisis and Global Crisis 2008/09 
 Exchange rate changes
1 
(in percent) 
Stock  market changes
2 
(in per cent) 
Change in GDP growth
3 
(in percentage points) 
 Asian Crisis
4 
Glob. Crisis
5 
Asian Crisis Glob. Crisis Asian Crisis Glob. Crisis 
Australia -23 -32 -11 -51 -2.0 -3.8 
China 0 12 -12 -71 -3.5 -6.5 
Hong Kong -1 1 -56 -59 -15.3 -15.1 
India -20 -23 -35 -56 -1.3 -3.5 
Indonesia -83 -24 -62 -55 -23.5 -2.2 
Japan -21 36 -35 -58 -4.6 -11.0 
Korea -47 -37 -60 -49 -14.1 -9.9 
Malaysia -43 -14 -72 -40 -19.6 -13.6 
New Zealand -32 -36 -34 -41 -4.4 -6.2 
Philippines -40 -17 -58 -51 -8.4 -7.9 
Singapore -19 -11 -56 -58 -13.6 -19.6 
Thailand -53 -12 -68 -56 -13.3 -13.1 
Notes: 1- maximum depreciation (-) or appreciation (+) against US$. 2-Peak  to trough change in the benchmark stock 
market index, 3- largest difference in year-on-year real GDP growth rates. 4- From June 1997 to June 2000. 5- From June 
2007 to March 2009. 
Source: Adopted from Filardo and etc (2010) 
 
In general, all countries in the world were pursuing the traditional macroeconomic policies in 
dealing with the impact of US and the global economic crises. The globalization of the world 
economy or economic interdependece among countries in the world in the form of 
international trade has resulted in lower real economic growth for countries that rely on 
industrial nations for exports growth. Unemployment in the countries have started to rise and 
many foreign firms have closed down their factories. Anticipation that the worst of the crisis 
is approaching in countries including developing countries such as Asia have resulted in 
implementing fiscal stimulus plans and reducing interest rates to confine increasing non-
performing loans (NPLs) or delaying the number of bankruptcies.  
 
Table 2 shows economic policies that were pursued in selected developed and emerging 
countries in dealing with the impact of the global economic crisis.  The loose monetray policy 
and fiscal stimulus were implemented to tackle the impact of the global economic crisis. 
Monetary policy actions included interest rate cuts, reduced reserve requirements, use of 
official reserves to stabilise foreign exchange markets and policies to expand domestic credit. 
The budgetary policies together with other measures in the budget such as stimulating 
domestic demand, buying local products, encouraging small and medium size industries 
growth, infrastructure developments, education and health programme, re-training 
programme for workers who have been retrenched, extension of credit to SME and primary 
industries, etc, that were announced however the effect of the policies seem to be minimal. 
Therefore other measures such liquidity assistance to financial institutions, lend in foreign 
currency and other measures were introduced to calm not only to financial and good markets 
but also to assets market (i.e equity and bonds).  
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                                                                        TABLE 2 
            Policy  actions taken in North America, Europe, Asa and the Pacific 
 CA US EU CH UK AU CN HK IN ID JP KR MY NZ PH SG TH 
Ease 
monetary 
policy 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Introduce 
Fiscal 
stimulus 
 √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Liquidity 
assistance 
in local 
currency 
√ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √  √ √   
Lend 
foreign 
currency 
√  √ √ √ √   √ √ √ √  √ √ √  
Expand 
deposit 
Insurance 
 √ √  √ √  √  √  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Guarantee 
non-depo 
liab. 
√ √ √  √ √      √  √    
Prepare 
Bank 
capital 
injection 
 √ √ √ √  √ √ √  √ √     √ 
Create 
demand 
for assets 
√ √ √ √  √ √  √ √ √ √ √     
Impose 
short-sale 
restrictions 
√ √ √ √ √ √  √  √ √ √    √  
Relax 
mark to 
market 
rules 
 √ √ √ √     √ √ √ √  √   
Note: CA=Canada; US=United States; EU=Euro Area; CH=Switzerland; UK=United Kingdom; AU=Australia; 
CN=China; HK=Hong Kong SAR; IN=India; ID=Indonesia; JP=Japan; KR=Korea; MY=Malaysia; NZ=New 
Zealand; PH=Philippines; SG=Singapore; TH=Thailand. 
Source: Adopted from Filardo, etc (2010). 
 
     2.0 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS VERSUS AMERICAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
A major factor that contributed to the Asian currency crisis in 1997-98 were cross-
border flows of portfolio investments in bonds, equity (stocks) and huge short-term inter-
bank loans (Box 2). The most important difference between foreign portfolio investment 
(FPI) and FDI and long-term external loans is that the FPI can flow in and out of a country 
within a very short time. When FPI found its way into the banking system, pushed up 
domestic expenditure and increased the current account deficit, its outflow could affect the 
domestic economy in a number of ways. like a decrease in asset prices, a rise in interest rates, 
the emergence of liquidity problems in the banking sector and a depreciation of the value of 
the currency (Corbo and Hernandez 1996). As the pre-crisis Asian experience has shown, FPI 
can lead to an inflation of asset prices and provoke interest rate hikes.  Furthermore, if the 
central bank did not act quickly enough and the volume of international reserves declined, 
then the reversal might cause a balance of payments crisis. As shown in the Asian crisis stock 
prices fell and contributed to a loss of international reserves and an increase in domestic 
interest rates, a depreciation of the exchange rate, or both. The interest rates, asset prices or 
exchange rates fluctuated too widely in late 1997 to 1998. The fluctuation dented the 
economic performance of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea. The high interest 
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rates had led to corporate failures and the non-performing loans (NPLs) had increased. The 
fluctuation of currency value vis-à-vis US$ deteriorated export competitiveness. Other factors 
which contributed to the crisis were the banks that borrowed funds from the external market, 
banks over-lending to property and stocks, financial deregulation, capital account 
convertibility, inflows of FPI into money and capital markets, weak banking supervision and 
cronyism. Factors that contributed to the financial crisis were largely generated in the 
external economy. In the case of the US financial crisis even though the external factor was 
substantial, the crisis was by and large caused by activities in the internal economy.  
 
The developed countries including IMF lectured that the main reasons or causes of the 
crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997-98 were the economic mismanagement by governments, the 
soft-pegging of currencies, over-borrowing by the private sector and cronyism. Portfolio 
investments were hardly blamed. Medicines for the crisis were said to be the implementation 
of the so-called Washington Consensus run by the IMF under its financial assistance 
program, i.e., Structural Adjustment Lending.  Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia signed 
into the IMF assistance package but Malaysia implemented its own. The three countries 
recovered from the crisis but the reasons may not be solely attributed to IMF financial 
package since from 1999 the world economy stabilised and subsequently expanded.  
 
                                                         BOX 2 
                     Asian Crisis and Policy Response: In Brief 
Factors 
 financial deregulation/liberalization: allowing operation of foreign banks (commercial and 
investment), foreign asset/mutual or trust fund companies and  foreign stock brokerage firms;  opening 
money and capital markets to foreign portfolio investors; freeing interest rates to be market determined. 
 full capital account convertibility. Short-term capital increased largely by portfolio investments 
and short-term bank loans 
 speculation in asset (equity and property) markets 
 overborrowing by households  
 unhedged overborrowing mainly in US$ by the corporate sector from offshore financial markets. 
 borrowing by local banks of short-term loans in US$ through intra-bank loans. 
 lessening of money or capital market instruments for sterilization purposes by the central banks;  
related to the government budget policy i.e balanced or surplus budget, thus lesser treasury bills used in 
mopping excess liquidity caused by external capital flows 
 overlending by banks to household equity and property. 
 unchecked bubble in equity and property markets. 
 increasing interest rates to stem asset price inflation but the policy failed since the expectation of 
profit in asset markets was larger than in interest-bearing assets. 
 unchecked speculation in currency markets, with consequent exchange rate fluctuations. 
 politics and corporate links (cronyism) 
 
Policy Response 
 tight budget policy-reduce government expenditures, cut subsidies, reduce public investments 
(infrastructure projects) 
 tight monetary policy or high interest rate 
 flexible exchange 
 cleaning up the banking system: weak or insolvent banks were allowed to close down or sold to 
local or foreign competitors. 
 private non-financial enterprises which were weak or saddled with huge debt were allowed to 
declare bankruptcy or be sold to local or foreign competitors. 
 assets management company to deal with bad loans (NPLs) and banks in distress. 
 Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea sought financial assistance package from IMF.  
 
Malaysia’s Case.  
 intially followed IMF advice i.e reduced government budget, increased interest rate, flexible 
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exchange rate but these failed to create confidence in the economy. The government implemented policies 
against the orthodox stream. 
 increased government expenditures, ran budget deficits 
 lowered interest rates 
 re-classified NPL from three months to six months 
 imposed capital controls on outflow of portfolio capital 
 fixed exchange rate at US$1:00=RM3.80 on 2 September 1998. 
 de-internationalised the RM, i.e. RM not to be traded in offshore market. 
 imposed control on resident and non-resident movement of foreign currency abroad. 
 tightened up transactions in stock market; imposed restrictions on short-selling; closed down the 
central limit order book (CLOB) based in Singapore, the secondary market abroad that conducted trade in 
company stocks in KLSE, to prevent outflow of capital. 
 strengthened banking regulation and supervision. 
 exercised commercial bank and finance company mergers, allowing only ten local banks to be in 
the financial system.  
 created universal stock brokering firms (reducing the number of stock brokers). 
 tightened corporate laws and installed corporate governance. 
 established asset management company, Danaharta, to clean-up bad NPLs from the banks. 
 established special purpose vehicle, Danamodal, to recapitalise financial institutions. 
 established corporate and debt restructuring committee (CDRC) to help firms restructure debst. 
 bailed-out selected private firms. 
 
      
                          Malaysia’s Response to The Financial Crisis 1997/98  
 
Malaysia‘s government initially followed policies that were presumbly adviced by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government had cut public expenditures, i.e 
cancelled or scaled down various infrastructure projects, restored market confidence by 
increasing the interest rate so it would eliminate excessive fluctutaion of  the exhange rate 
(RM/US$), decreased classification of NPL from 6 months to 3 months, strenghtened 
banking regulations and supervision. However, the policies were unable to increase the 
market confidence and reflate the economy. The real GDP growth fell below 1 percent, the 
unemployment rate soared to about 4 percent, the number of corporate failures rose, inflation 
rate escalated, foreign portfolio capital continued leaving the economy,  inflow of FDI 
dropped and the exports receipts were still unstable and declined. To move the economy 
away from the economic depression, the government turned around the policies. The 
government increased public expenditure, reduced interest rates, the statutory rate was 
reduced from 13 percent to about 4 percent, reclassified NPLs from 3 months to 6 months, 
introduced the capital and currency control (CEC) measures, fixed the exchange rate 
US$1:00=RM3.80, established asset management company (Danaharta) to remove NPL‘s 
from the banking sector, established special purpose vehicle (Danamodal) to recapitalize the 
weak banks, introduced corporate and debt recovery agency (CDRC) to help corporate 
entities that needed help in restucturing their debt and bailed-out private companies which 
were closely linked to the ruling government.  These measures that surfaced are classified as 
heterodox in this paper, were a response when the orthodox economic policies implemented 
before September 1998 were unable to stem the rapid decline of the economy and instead 
drove the economy into a deeper economic crisis. The policies recommended by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand also failed to 
reduce the impact of the currency crisis on those economies.  
 
Malaysia introduced capital controls on September 1, 1998 mainly to deter the outflow of 
portfolio capital. Foreign direct investment and repatriation of the income of foreign firm 
activities were not affected. Under Malaysia‘s CEC policy, long-term flows and FDI were not 
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regulated.  The RM was fixed at RM3.80 to the US dollar to curb speculation on the 
currency. The ringgit was pegged at a level of RM3.80=USD1. The pegged exchange rate 
arrangement was to reduce the volatility of the ringgit exchange rate and to promote a stable 
environment conducive to the economic recovery.. The main benefit of the introduction of 
the pegged exchange rate regime was relative stability in the foreign exchange market. 
Besides the pegging, the government also de-internationalised RM (currency control), i.e the 
RM was no longer traded in the offshore markets. According to the former Prime Minister, 
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (2000), the main purpose of the exchange control was to regain 
control of the ringgit from speculators and manipulators in the international foreign exchange 
market. The policy brought back about RM20-25 billion in bank accounts abroad into the 
country‘s financial system.  
 
Implicitly, the capital control managed to insulate the economy from the volatility of foreign 
investment in the capital market. Also, the measure had increased the degree of   
independence of the monetary policy, hence the activity of sterilization was reduced. Since 
the movement of international reserves by speculative capital had been cut, the central bank, 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) had the freedom to introduce stabilisation measures without 
worrying about the accumulation of reserves from speculation market channels. This matter 
is important in order to avoid the economy from running off its international reserves, hence 
further erosion of balance of payments positions and devaluation of currency can be avoided 
 
The CEC had also helped stabilise monetary aggregates and prevented a liquidity crunch in 
the economy. Measures to control trading of the ringgit in offshore markets and the fixed 
exchange rate managed to further segregate the economy from external price shocks and 
enabled the export sector to emerge as an engine for economic recovery. Furthermore, for 
companies that had borrowed money from abroad, the fixed exchange rate assisted them by 
stabilising the volume of the principal sum and thus the interest to be paid on the loan. There 
is, however, no evidence to show that the movement of foreign portfolio capital had a 
detrimental impact on the corporate sector, except in so far as it influenced share prices of 
firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) The performance of the corporate 
sector, in terms of profits registered or dividend payments, depends on economic factors such 
as demand and supply. 
 
The main issue arising from the currency crisis in Malaysia was the problem of private sector 
debt. The total volume of debts was estimated at more than RM60 billion in 1997. The 
companies most badly affected were those involved in construction, property development 
and banking. The introduction of the CEC provided time for the CDRC, Danaharta and 
Danamodal to clear up the debt crisis in the corporate and banking sectors. Danaharta and 
CDRC have resolved nearly RM100 billion worth of NPLs, while Danamodal has 
recapitalised ten financial institutions to the tune of RM7.6 billion. Danaharta and Danamodal 
have prevented a meltdown of the banking sector, while the CDRC has helped turn around a 
long list of debt-laden companies. In some cases the government had to bail-out or buy over 
companies/corporations. The rationale of bailing-out firms may be related to the employment 
factor and worry of the collapse of firms which may hinder the government‘s effort to 
eliminate the burgeoning NPL and improve corporate performance.  
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       3.0  ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC MEASURES TO FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
The above sections describe the factors that caused the financial crisis in the United States of 
America and Southeast and East Asia economies. Except in the cases of Indonesia, Thailand 
and South Korea, the economic policies executed by the governments of Malaysia and US 
implicitly do not belong to neo-liberal or neo-classical or main-stream types. The 
government‘s intervention by implementing expansionary fiscal policy, lowering interest 
rates, re-structuring or re-arranging the financial system by introducing various measures, 
bailing-out failed corporate entities and so on are actually against the orthodox economic 
view. This paper believes that the mentioned governments realized that the main-stream 
economics view on reflating an economy from the crisis, is to rely on market adjustment 
however the market adjustment was not sufficient or totally effective in dealing with the 
latest version of the economic crisis. By allowing the market itself to correct the 
disequlibrium it may take a longer time for the economy to move to equilibrium or depart 
from the crisis range or may not happen and the economic situation may get worse. Given the 
soaring rate of unemployment, corporate failures, banks facing illiquidity or on the brink of 
bankruptcy, real GDP growth declining and other related crucial economic variables showing 
a miserable trend, the governments had to step in before the crisis got worse. The policies 
implemented by the governments, such as in the US and Malaysia are an alternative 
economic policy or what this paper describes as a heterodox economic policy.  
 
The heterodox economic policy is defined as economic measures taken by the  government in 
addressing the inability of the orthodox economic policy (mainstream economics) in tackling 
the impact of the balance of payment or currency or financial crisis on the real economy. 
There are two parts of the policy, i.e the policy related to the internal economy and the policy 
related to the external economy. The policy on the internal economy basically refers to the 
government‘s intervention in the real and financial sectors. Given the soaring unemployment 
rate, widely corporate failures, banks facing illiquidities, real GDP growth declining and 
other related crucial economic variables, the government has to step in before the crisis gets 
worse. Policies of the internal economy such as (1) price adjustments via implementation of 
income policy - price and wage control in order to achieve disinflation or in other words to 
reduce inflation rate, (2) containing banks failure  by  lowering interest rate and thereby 
reducing the non-performing loans (NPLs) from turning to bad loans and delaying 
bankruptcies of consumers and firms, (3) re-classification of non-performing loans from short 
to long term to reduce banks and corporates failure; (4) related to 2 and 3, establishing 
institutions such as an asset management company vehicle to clear off bad loans from the 
banking sector and also establish a special purpose vehicle to recapitalise the weak banks; (5) 
bailout corporate entities where possible to reduce pressure on the labour market; (6) reduce 
speculation in asset markets (equity/stocks) by restricting short-term selling and (7) 
implementing budget deficit until the market confidence re-emerges or corporate sector 
startsto re-invest. In addition to the mentioned policies, the government has to improve the 
financial system because in any financial crisis the main culprits are the financial institutions.  
Therefore the sector needs to be regulated and supervised effectively and efficiently. The 
financial or banking acts need to be restructured or revamped or repealed and the ―power‖ of 
financial regulators need to be increased. The purpose of financial regulation is to promote 
national growth and competitiveness, to promote efficient resource allocation, to maintain 
monetary and financial stability, to protect the interests of depositors/investors and to 
minimize financial crimes. Innovation and development of financial products are vital and 
efficient in mobilizing capital/savings. However the government needs to study the risk and 
the impact of the new product to the entire financial system.  
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On the other hand, the policy for the external eonomy includes matters such as imposing 
capital control either on the inflow or outflow of portfolio investment. Portfolio investment is 
undesirable during ―the boom period‖ or during the higher demand for financial assets or 
when the prices of assets are escalating. The inflow of foreign portfolio investment will 
actually further aggravate the enlarged demand of the financial assets contributed by the local 
investors. Since the portfolio investment may cause more harm than good, the government or 
central bank need to control the capital. This has been shown in the Asian and Mexican crises 
in which the balance of payments was determined by the capital account rather than the 
currenct account. The current account of both regions during the period were in deficit. The 
inflow of short-term capital financed the current account deficits which was not a reliable 
move. The currency control is also a desirable policy when the government is unable to beat 
the speculators. If a country adopts a pegged or fixed exchange rate system without any 
control on currency trading then the exchange rate is prone to currency speculation.  In 
general the stock of international reserves in a developing countries particularly are unable to 
ward off any speculation of their currencies. If there is a control on capital and on currency 
trading in offshore markets, a stable foreign price will be preserved and the fiscal and 
monetary policies would be more effective in dealing with the crisis or reflating the 
economy. There are lots of arguments as to what extent is the effectiveness of capital and 
currency control and how these measures assist the macroeconomic policies to promote 
economic recovery.  
  
From the experience of Malaysia, the standard macroeconomic policies were inadequate to 
correct economic imbalances that were caused by the currency-cum-financial crises. Since 
macroeconomic policy influences a limited number of economic fundamentals, i.e indicators 
of macreconomic stability such as interest rate and real GDP growth, therefore other 
economic policies which focus on certain aspects of the economy should be considered. In 
the case of US, the government did not exactly follow the mainstream economic solutions. 
The government implemented a massive fiscal stimulus program to eliminate the economic 
depression, decreased and maintained a low level of interest rate, introduced Troubled Assets 
Relief Programme (TARP) to clear off the toxic assets from the financial system and bailed 
out some major financial institutions including a few private companies, i.e automobile firms.   
 
What has been shown in the case of Malaysia in 1998 and in the US in 2007 is that 
mainstream economics seems to have failed in offering trusted remedies for the depressed 
economies. The ambiguous assumptions of mainstream economics such as perfect 
competition in terms of market, information, agents decision-making process and so on are 
unrelated to the real world. As advocated by Post-Keynesian as well as New Keynesian 
economics the real economy is subjected to imperfect competition. The imperfect 
competition produces multiple equilibrium in all ranges of the economic sectors. The 
financial crisis is related to market failure (private sector). The market failure is actually 
attributed to the government‘s failure in looking at or supervising the sector particularly the 
financial sector.  The government‘s policies in liberalising the financial sector including 
allowing the creation of various types of financial products without examining the possible 
risks brought by the products is regarded as one of the main causes of the financial crisis. The 
government had failed to foresee what would be happen in the future due to the deregulation 
of the financial sector and permitted new financial products to be created and traded in the 
economy without knowing the risks carried by those products. So the solution of the financial 
crisis is primarily to check the financial liberalization and/or capital account convertibility 
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policies. Factors of cronisym and favouritism in government projects or privatisation projects 
should also be blamed.  
                                           The Rationale of  Capital Control  
 
In international finance, capital control is not a new issue. Industrialised countries have used 
capital controls to check fluctuations of the exchange rate. Under the Bretton Woods system, 
capital control was an integral part of the system for ensuring the stability of the exchange 
rate. The maintenance of capital controls had been authorised in the Articles of Agreement 
negotiated at Bretton Woods in order to reconcile exchange rate stability with other goals: in 
the short run, concerted programmes of post-war reconstruction; in the long run, the pursuit 
of full employment (Eichengreen 1996: 188). After the collapse of the fixed exchange rate 
regime under Bretton Woods, the flexible exchange rate system gained popularity. Since then 
particularly in industrial countries,  currency and capital controls on international capital 
flows have been eliminated gradually.  
 
Capital account convertibility refers to the availability of foreign exchange to a country‘s 
residents to purchase assets abroad, or to non-residents to purchase assets in the country. It 
also implies allowing residents to accept foreign currency for assets that  they wish to sell to 
non-residents, and vice-versa. In other words, capital account convertibility means lifting up 
any forms of control on international capital transactions (financial assets) and freeing 
currency transactions. There are many forms of capital restrictions from direct control inflow 
or outflow to indirect control of the capital inflow or outflow. This broad definition suggests 
that it will be difficult to generalize about capital controls because they can take many forms 
and may be applied for various purposes (Bakker, 1996). Controls may take the form of 
taxes, price or quantity controls, or outright prohibitions on international trade in assets.  
Example of controls:  Chile requires non-interest-bearing reserves against certain capital 
inflows; Switzerland limits interest payments to foreign owners of claims;  France and Japan 
– prohibit residents from purchasing foreign securities except through domestic financial 
institutions. Other examples of forms of capital control include rationing foreign access to the 
new issue market and limiting domestic financial institutions foreign currency tradings 
(including swaping)(Cooper, 1999).  
 
Capital controls are not the same as exchange controls (restriction of trade in currencies), but 
the two are closely related. Although currency and bank deposits are one type of asset, 
exchange controls may be used to control the current account rather than the capital account 
(Neely, 1999). For example, the government may require importers to buy foreign exchange 
from them (rationing ‗scare‖ foreign exchange), and/or not allow exporters to deposit 
national currency (export earnings) in foreign banks offshore. The main purpose of this kind 
of exchange control is to limit speculation on the currency. 
 
Capital control, as a policy instrument was an alternative measure and as the last resort to 
curb the high swings of portfolio capital inflow and volatile exchange rates. The UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) stressed that developing countries 
needed to make use of capital controls to prevent and manage financial crises. In fact, 
UNCTAD had consistently warned about the dangers of financial liberalization and the risks 
posed by allowing freedom of the inflow and outflow of funds. Again in 1998, UNCTAD 
argued that developing countries needed to protect themselves against international financial 
instability with the application of capital control since the measures constitute a proven 
technique for dealing with volatile capital (UNCTAD, 1998).  This type of control or 
restrictions on capital movements will in some ways install greater autonomy in the making 
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of macroeconomic policy especially monetary policy (Tobin, 1993)
4
. Neo-classical and free 
trade doctrine advocaters are against the policy of capital control. They stress that the 
countries should maintain capital account convertibility (and open further) and adopt the 
floating exchange rate as well as implement a prudent macroeconomic policy to counter any 
macroeconomic (financial) instability which may occur. However, what is meant by prudent 
macroeconomic policy? Furthermore, sound macroeconomic policies do not handle the huge 
volatility of capital movement effectively. 
 
The capital control policy which re-emerged since the policy packages were prescribed to 
Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1998 
failed to contain the impact of the financial crisis. Moreover the package prescribed by the 
IMF generally resulted in more trouble for the receiving economies such as in Indonesia and 
countries in Africa and Latin America in the 1980s. The package which comprised of a 
substantial fiscal contraction and tight monetary policy coupled with financial reforms had 
been criticized. It has been realized that there was little need for sharp fiscal contraction in an 
economic environment where domestic saving rates remained high and the investment rate 
was falling. The policy response of high interest rates and tight control of fiscal spending 
made matters worse rather than better. While lowering interest rates would improve the 
servicing of domestic currency loans,  but at the same time, it would lead to greater exchange 
rate depreciation and further deterioration in bank balance sheets. In the IMF package 
prescribed to the affected countries (excluding Malaysia), the economy had to run tight 
monetary and fiscal policies to defend the exchange rate. The IMF policy was less workable.  
With high interest rates, the currency of the receiver countries of IMF packages continued to 
depreciate.   Furthermore, the packages aggravated the soundness of banks and caused loss of 
confidence in the financial system. Stabilizing the economies by exchange rate stability for 
restoring investor confidence was a doubtful remedy. Funds attracted by high interest rates 
are usually short-term and speculative; trying desperately to attract these funds ultimately 
heightens the risk of re-igniting chaos. Moreover, in as much as economic growth has 
dropped sharply in countries hit by the crisis, investor confidence cannot be restored in any 
true sense in this way.  
 
Since the US economy was in disarray and uncertainties in EU economies due to the debt 
crisis, so the future profit expectation in investing liquid assets in those countries plunged. 
Investment banks, trust funds, hedge funds and other related institutions have moved 
commodity markets and also enlarged investment in portfolio markets in emerging 
economies such as in Brazil, Mexico, members of ASEAN, Hong Kong, South Korea and 
South Africa since 2009. The heavy influx of the investment has caused appreciation of 
currencies and implicated macroeconomic stability and this had  prompted the countries to 
introduce capital control policies to safeguard their economies. For instance, Bank Indonesia 
in May 2010 had imposed measures in discouraging short-term debt inflows. Also the central 
bank had set a one-month minimum holding period for investors in its bills last week The 
South Korean government on 13 June 2010 had also tightened rules on currency derivatives 
to reduce volatility on Won. The rules are expected to come into force in October 2010 in 
which the government would  set a ceiling of 50 per cent of equity capital for currency 
derivatives positions of domestic banks and a 250 per cent ceiling for foreign bank branches 
                                                          
4
 As quoted by Tobin (1993), losses of national macroeconomic autonomy are of two kinds. First, capital 
mobility surrenders some autonomy to the rest of the world, specifically to the foreign policy makers who 
determine world interest rates and the other attractions of external assets. Second, capital mobility gives 
considerable power to speculators who can generate excess volatility of exchange rates in the same way that 
they produce excess volatility of stock prices. 
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to account for their typically much lower capital.  The Indian government had proposed a 
capital-gains tax on stock trades. India's move was similar to one by Pakistan on June 5, 
2010. Other countries such as Taiwan, Brazil, Colombia and Russia have already tightened 
rules on inflow or outflow of (foreign) portfolio capital. The Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) plans to review its rules for the fund management industry. MAS had set 
up a department to supervise and drive regulatory policies on fund management activities. 
The IMF which was against capital control measures has now realised that the measures are 
desirable in order to check unwanted impact of cross-border financial flows. One justification 
for capital controls is to prevent the inflow of hot money from boosting the value of the home 
currency excessively, thereby undermining competitiveness. Another is to reduce 
vulnerability to sudden changes in financial-market sentiment, which can wreak havoc with 
domestic growth and employment. The IMF has only now acknowledged  that developing 
countries with capital controls were hit less badly by the fallout from the sub-prime mortgage 
meltdown. The capital controls in countries such as Chile, Colombia, Taiwan and Malaysia  
have shown the relevance of the policy. Taiwan‘s use of administrative measures that rely 
heavily on close monitoring of flows may be inappropriate in settings where bureaucratic 
capacity is more limited. Similarly, Chilean-style unremunerated reserve requirements may 
be easier to evade in countries with extensive trading in sophisticated derivatives. Indeed as 
recently as November 2009, the Brazilian government had announced an imposition of 
temporary tax on inflows of speculative capital. Controls on foreign capital into emerging 
economies can be part of the policy options available to governments to counter the potential 
negative economic and financial effects of sudden surges in capital. In 1942, when working 
to establish the International Monetary Fund, John Maynard Keynes said the "control of 
capital movements, both inward and outward, should be a permanent feature of the post-war 
system."  
 
Portfolio capital is different with loans and foreign direct investment (FDI) in terms of 
contribution to economic development, impact on prices and exchange rate. The most 
outstanding feature of portfolio investment (FPI) as opposed to FDI and external loan, is that 
the FPI (―hot money‖) can reverse in a very short time. When FPI have found their way into 
the banking system and have pushed up domestic expenditures and increased the current 
account deficit, their reversal can affect the domestic economy through a decrease in asset 
prices, a jump in interest rates, liquidity problems in the banking sector, or a depreciation of 
the currency (Corbo  and Hernandez, 1996). Furthermore, if the central bank does not react 
quickly enough and the stock of international reserves is low, the reversal may cause a 
balance of payment crisis.  
 
The FPI can cause inflation of asset prices (including consumer prices) and provoke interest 
rate hikes. These matters stimulate a ―chain-reaction‖ and ―herd behaviour‖ in the asset 
market. Due to the expectation of an increase in future returns on investment, domestic 
investors further pour their money or savings in the market; consequently a ―bubble‖ will be 
created in the market. If future expectation of making profits falls, then foreign (domestic) 
investors  will leave the market  by selling their domestic stock holdings and buying foreign 
currency.  The general stock price index will fall and, depending on the exchange rate system, 
either a loss of international reserves and an increase in domestic interest rates, or a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, or both may occur.  If interest rates, asset prices, 
or exchange rates fluctuate too widely it can be very damaging for the economy because (i) 
high interest rates will increase corporate failure (non-performing loans may accelerate) and, 
(ii) appreciation of currency value will decrease competitiveness or profitabilities of 
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exporting and import-competing sectors, current accounts of balance of payment will 
deteriorate thereafter. The other impact of FPI is that it will induce a diversion of resource 
allocation (deposit) in the banking system from the productive to the unproductive sector. In 
other words, the resources move from the tradable to non-tradable sectors, and the shifting 
will harm the real economic growth in the long run, which is exactly what happened in 
Malaysia prior to the Asian crisis.  
 
                                    Malaysia: The Logic of Capital Control   
 
As mentioned earlier Malaysia imposed a capital control on the outflow of portfolio 
investment on 2
nd
  September 1998. Long-term flows and FDI were not regulated. The 
government had also imposed an exchange control to disallow non-residents from holding the 
ringgit either in the form of hard currency or in bank accounts in offshore markets.  
 
The main objective of the capital control in Malaysia was to delay a fall in international 
reserve. International reserve is a part of the monetary base. A fall in the reserve, means 
monetary aggregates will be unstable and might create illiquidity in the financial system. The 
monetary base or high power money (M
B
) consists of domestic credit (D) plus international 
reserves or foreign assets (F) held by the central bank, as given by the equation  M
B
 = D + F.  
A change either in international reserves and domestic credit will influence the monetary 
base. D is a ‗control variable‘, which means that a government can control expansion (or 
accumulation) of domestic credit through interest rate policy or credit rationing. But F is an 
‗exogenous variable‘, that is, it depends on external sector positions (balance of payments 
account) as represented by the equation F= CA + KA, where CA=current account and 
KA=capital account. To simplify the matter, we decompose the KA into two groups, non-
speculative capital FNS and speculative capital (FPI, hereafter FS). We can rewrite the 
equation and read as CA + [FDI + FLoan + FPI] = F. A change in F will reflect  changes in D 
and M
B
. If we assume that a deficit in CA is offset by FNS, thus F will be equal to FS. 
Therefore the monetary base is entirely influenced by the FPI
5
.  So it must be true that M
B
= D 
+ FS. Control of the Fs allows the government to manage the monetary sector more 
effectively. This is done by delaying a fall in international reserves through the outflow of Fs 
and allows accumulation of international reserves through the current account and non-
speculative capital. Therefore, the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) will have 
greater freedom in implementing monetary policies without worrying about the accumulation 
of reserves from the speculative market. Secondly, the policy of capital control will permit 
the economy to re-build international reserves via other components of balance of payments. 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in July 1997, the Malaysian economy had run  losses 
in international reserves particularly from the outflow of portfolio capital. Thirdly, capital 
control can avoid a liquidity or credit crunch in the economy. The reason as mentioned above 
is the delay in a fall in international reserves. And lastly, the policy will install predictability 
in the exchange rate.  
 
The main objective of Malaysia‘s exchange control on the other hand was to regain control of 
the ringgit from speculators and manipulators in the international foreign exchange market 
(Mahathir, 2000). This was done by ‗freezing‘ the external ringgit accounts of the non-
residents in Malaysia. Non-residents were not allowed to sell or lend the ringgit to other non-
residents but could invest their funds freely in the country. Thus, the currency traders were 
                                                          
5
 The movement of Fs is not only influenced by the exchange rate but also by money supply growth. In 
Malaysia, the main factor influencing money supply growth (and exchange rate stability) in pre-crisis and 
during the crisis is the short-term capital (FPI) (see Bank Negara Annual Report 1993 and 1994). 
 17 
unable to shortsell the ringgit and change its exchange rate. Only the government could 
determine the exchange rate.  
 
A combination of capital control and exchange control had increased the degree of 
independency of the monetary policy. The exchange control assisted the effectiveness of the 
capital control by alleviating speculation on the RM in the international foreign currency 
market. Those controls allowed BNM to embrace the monetary sector firmly. The measures  
also reduced sterilization costs to the bank. The policy of exchange and capital control 
granted the government a way to deal with the economic  recession more efficiently.  
 
 
                                                      4.0    CONCLUSION 
 
The global finance and the impact of US‘ economic crisis on the world economy to a certain 
extent rang the bell to the governments around the world that excessive financialization and a 
complete capital account convertibility without proper regulations or active monitoring as 
well as good surveillance in place by relevant authorities will damage the whole economy. 
The cost of the financial crisis to the economy was not only in the US but also  experienced 
greatly by Asia and Latin America.  Roughly, the cost of repairing the financial system 
particularly accounted about more than 10 percent of the GDP. Furthermore, the economic 
condition will be stagnated with lower real GDP growth rate, escalating inflation rate, the 
soaring unemployment rate and the increasing incidence of poverty. The market (or 
economic) confidence will drop internally and externally. In the case of US the cost of 
financial crisis in absolute terms was even larger to developing countries.  
 
Eventhough the crises in the US and Asia were different in terms of the origin of the crisis, 
however the policy which was embarked by Malaysia for instance could provide some 
lessons in dealing with the financial crisis. One main lesson that countries in East and 
Southeast Asia have learnt is that opening capital accounts (capital account convertibility) 
particularly the inflow and outflow of short-term capital need to be monitored  and the 
movement of the capital need to be guided or monitored with some element of capital or 
exchange controls. The control  is essential presumably to ensure that movement of the 
capital will not significantly disrupt producers and exporters in setting prices of the goods. 
Capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investment in production activities are welcomed 
by most countries in the world and the capital is most desirable than international short-term 
capital or foreign portfolio capital. It is because the capital stimulate economic growth and 
the reversal of capital in the short-term is considered nil. On the other hand, inflow of 
portfolio capital into capital or money markets may be desirable for banking activities. 
However since the frequency of such capital is very high therefore the rapid reversals of the 
capitals can lead to domestic liquidity problems.  
 
In a nutshell, given the extensive development of financial products which carry uncertainty 
risks, the speed of transactions, and a huge portfolio capital movement in the international 
financial markets, any countries involved in such markets are prone to unexpected currency 
or financial crisis.  Given the extensive financialization and policy of capital account 
convertibility, these moves have  delivered complications to the government in stabilizing the 
macroeconomy if there is a siginificant economic shock from internal or external sectors. 
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